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This paper evaluates proposals for an annual wealth tax. While a dozen OECD countries levied 
wealth taxes in the recent past, now only three retain them, with only Switzerland raising a 
comparable fraction of revenue as recent proposals for a US wealth tax. Studies of these taxes 
sometimes, but not always, find a substantial behavioral response, including of saving, portfolio 
change, avoidance, and evasion, and the impact depends crucially on design features, especially 
the broadness of the base and enforcement provisions. Because the US proposals are very 
different from any previous wealth tax, experience in other countries offers only broad lessons, 
but we can gain insights from closely related taxes, such as the property and the estate tax, and 
















A primary reason for imposing a wealth tax is to shift the tax burden toward the most afflu-
ent households. This goal is evident in the choice of wealth as a base for the tax, given that
wealth is considerably more unequally distributed than the most common tax bases, income
and consumption. In 2016, for example, the top 1% of households ranked by net worth held
40% of US wealth, while the top 1% ranked by income earned 24% of income (Wolff 2017).
In addition, wealth taxes typically have high wealth thresholds before any tax is due, and
may also include a graduated structure of tax rates that apply above the thresholds. Height-
ened consideration of a wealth tax is almost certainly tied to the increase in inequality over
the past four decades: although the details of this increase are disputable, in our view the
conclusion that it has increased non-trivially is not (for discussion, see the Symposium on
Rising Inequality of Income and Wealth in the Fall 2020 issue of this journal). The wealth tax
has had some prominent academic adherents: for example, Kaldor (1956) called for a wealth
tax for developing countries, Allais (1977) proposed to replace most direct taxes with a 2%
wealth tax in France, and Piketty (2014) called for a global progressive wealth tax.
Even some of those who are concerned about rising economic inequality raise questions
about whether a wealth tax is the appropriate policy response. Measuring some forms of
wealth on an annual basis is very difficult: for example, how does one value pension ac-
counts, life insurance, trusts, or closely-held family corporations? Heterogeneous measur-
ability of assets could cause horizontal inequity and a flight to more easily under-valued
assets, and consequent understatement of net wealth. Recent experience is not encouraging:
while a dozen high-income European countries levied wealth taxes in the recent past, now
only three retain them, which suggests that the other nine countries determined that any
benefits associated with such taxes do not justify their costs. In addition, there are a range
of other policy options to tackle inequality.
In this essay, we begin with a basic conceptual discussion of the base and tax rates for a
wealth tax. We then provide an overview of the recent wealth taxes in European countries.
The United States has never levied an annual wealth tax, but during the 2019-20 contest for
the Democratic presidential nomination, wealth tax proposals were put forward by Senators
Bernard Sanders and Elizabeth Warren. As we will see, none of the European wealth taxes
either applied rates anywhere near the 6 or 8% top rates in these proposals nor established
such a broad base, and only Switzerland raises a level of government revenue comparable to
these proposals. However, the US does have experience with some taxes that have aspects
similar to a wealth tax. As we discuss, the property tax is an annual tax on ownership of
immovable property; the estate tax is a wealth tax imposed at time of death; and the capital
gains tax is imposed on some increases in the value of some assets, albeit in a haphazard
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way.
We then turn to what we know about the behavioral effects of a wealth tax, including
effects on real behavior, on financial choices aimed at reducing the burden of a wealth tax,
on outright tax evasion, and on administrative and compliance costs. Studies of the Euro-
pean wealth taxes often, but not always, find a substantial behavioral response, although
the nature of the response varies. We emphasize that any lessons drawn from the European
experience must be applied to the recent US proposals with substantial caution, because
their design features—rate schedule, broadness of the base, and enforcement provisions—
are very different from any previous wealth tax.1
Finally, we look to optimal tax theory—should we as a society decide to tax our wealth
and, if yes, how so? We point out that the former conventional wisdom—that an optimal tax
system would feature no taxes on capital—has been overturned. Instead, we review a series
of arguments that justify some form of progressive taxation of wealth accumulation both in
the short and long run. We also discuss under which conditions such taxes should take the
form of a wealth tax versus alternative policies that have similar objectives. We conclude
with an overview of some political economy arguments for taxes on wealth accumulation
that go beyond the usual redistributional objectives.
2 What is a Wealth Tax?
2.1 The Base of a Wealth Tax
In principle, the base of a wealth tax is net worth—the value of assets minus debts. Like
all taxes, in practice, the base to which tax rates are applied could be narrowed by exemp-
tions, deductions, or preferential treatment (for example, discounted valuation) of certain
components of net wealth.
Determining the base for a wealth tax raises some thorny practical issues. For example,
the market value of a closely-held, family-run business, or of personal property perhaps
received via inheritance, is difficult to estimate at high frequency. The value of many assets,
including firms, consists of a projected flow of future income, which makes valuation highly
sensitive to the applied discount rate. Another issue is that wealth and wealth tax liability
is not always matched by disposable income in a given year, and so requiring the tax to be
remitted annually may raise liquidity problems.
Past and current wealth taxes contain many base-narrowing features. For example, all
wealth taxes exempt wealth below a certain threshold, which varies considerably across
1We do not address whether a wealth tax would be constitutional in the United States, a subject of some
controversy. For the two views, compare Johnson and Dellinger (2018) and Jensen (2019).
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countries. Some wealth taxes do not apply to wealth held in a pension or life insurance ac-
count. Some have exemptions or reduced tax rates for the wealth in one’s primary residence;
more generally, wealth tax rules often differ across real estate and financial assets. There are
reduced or deferred wealth taxes for certain business assets—for example, to prevent a situ-
ation where a family-owned firm would need to be liquidated to satisfy a wealth tax liability.
Wealth tax bases often leave out trusts established to pass wealth to later generations. Fi-
nally, wealth taxes have not been applied to implicit wealth in the form of an individual’s
human capital, although this is sometimes hard to disentangle from the value of business
partnerships (such as law firms or doctors’ practices).
2.2 The Rate of a Wealth Tax
It is a useful starting point to think of a wealth tax as a tax on the “normal” rate of return to
capital. A wealth tax at a rate of tw is equivalent to a tax rate of tw/r on capital income where
r is the interest rate. For an asset whose rate of return is 8%, a 4% wealth tax corresponds
to an annual 50% tax rate on capital income and an 8% wealth tax (the top rate in Sanders’
proposal) is equivalent to a 100% tax rate on capital income. Thus, the income-tax-equivalent
of a given wealth tax rate is smaller, the higher is the rate of return.
Despite this equivalence, a wealth tax differs from a capital income tax in an important
way. For a given amount of wealth, the tax liability of a wealth tax does not depend on the
amount of capital income the wealth actually generates, while in contrast a capital income
tax liability is related to that flow. For example, if all of one’s wealth were held in a zero-
interest demand deposit, a capital income tax would generate no tax liability, while a wealth
tax would. If wealth declines in a given year — that is, the return for that year is negative —
the wealth tax still applies.
Because a wealth tax affects the rate of return to saving, it changes the relative price of
consumption across time. For instance, in a world where r = .07, an 8% wealth tax turns a
7% rate of return before tax into a negative 1% return after tax.2 Whereas at a 7% return one
dollar becomes $7.61 (= (1 + .07)30) after 30 years, with a negative 1% return after tax, one
dollar becomes $0.74 (= (1− 0.01)30), ten times less. Tax rates that might sound low in the
income or sales tax context are actually much higher when compounded over time.
2The real average growth rate of the total wealth held by those on the Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest
Americans has been 7.3% per year between 1982 and 2018.
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3 Wealth Taxes: Existing and Proposed
3.1 European Wealth Taxes
In 1990, twelve European countries levied an annual tax on net wealth. By 2018, only four—
France, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland— levied such a tax, with Switzerland raising more
than three times as much revenue as a fraction of total revenues (3.9%) as any of the other
three countries (OECD 2018). In 2018, France replaced its annual wealth tax with a tax
only on immovable property. Italy levies an annual tax on financial assets in the form of a
stamp duty on bank and securities accounts, and the Netherlands has a hybrid system with
similarities to an annual wealth tax, imputing an asset-type-specific rate of return to assets
and assessing a 30% tax on those imputed returns.3
Table 1 provides some summary statistics about wealth taxes in high-income European
countries, and then in the bottom two rows compares them to the proposals made by Sena-
tors Sanders and Warren in 2019.
For the European wealth taxes, the average top rate was about 1%. Finland, Sweden
and Switzerland had top rates around 4% in the past, and the highest current rate is in
the Spanish region Extremadura at 3.75%. But the Spanish system, certain Swiss cantons,
and, in the past, some other countries feature a cap on the sum of wealth and income taxes
as a fraction of taxable income. Such a cap limits the liquidity problem of a high ratio of
income plus wealth tax liability to disposable income—and has the effect of imposing a zero
marginal tax on wealth for those at the cap. The cap also provides an additional incentive to
reduce reported taxable income.
Many of the wealth taxes described in Table 1 feature exemptions or preferential treat-
ment of some forms of assets, notably one’s main residence, life insurance proceeds, pension
wealth, and business assets. The exemption thresholds of these countries’ wealth taxes av-
erage about EUR 500,000 for married couples.
At first blush, it does not bode well for wealth taxes that, of the dozen European coun-
tries that have had them in the last three decades, only a quarter of them still do.4 Why
did the other three-quarters abandon them? A 2018 OECD report lists a number of con-
cerns: efficiency costs, risk of capital flight, failure to meet redistributive goals, and high
administrative costs. In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court deemed the wealth tax
3Several non-European countries have had wealth taxes, including Argentina, Bangladesh (more recently a
net-worth-triggered income tax surcharge or net wealth tax, whichever is higher), Colombia, India (repealed
in 2015), Indonesia (abolished in 1985), Pakistan (removed in 2003 and reinstated in 2013), and Sri Lanka (1959-
1993).
4The Florida intangibles tax offers a cautionary tale closer to home. It could be avoided by putting intangi-
bles in trust in December and distributing them out of trust in January, to the point that it became commonly
known as a voluntary tax; it was repealed in 2007.
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Table 1: European wealth taxes and the Sanders and Warren proposals.
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unconstitutional in 1995 on the grounds that the tax’s discrimination of property and fi-
nancial assets was an infringement against the fiscal principle of tax equality (Drometer et
al. 2018). In Sweden, it was argued that the special treatment of business equity made the
wealth tax regressive—taxing middle-class wealth (housing, financial assets) and exempting
the wealthiest individuals’ assets (large, closely-held firms)—and it was blamed for spurring
tax avoidance and evasion, including capital flight to tax havens (Waldenström, 2018).
3.2 The Swiss Example
Of the three European countries that still levy a wealth tax, Switzerland raises by far the
most revenue as a share of overall tax revenue, amounting to 1.1% of GDP in 2018, which is
comparable to the revenue projected for the recent US proposals. Hence, the Swiss example
is of particular interest for the wealth tax debate in the United States.
The wealth tax in Switzerland has a long history and in fact predates the modern income
tax. The Swiss tax system is generally structured in three layers: the federal, cantonal and
municipal level. There is no federal wealth tax, but all cantons must levy a comprehensive
wealth tax, over which they have significant freedom in designing. Eight cantons impose
flat rates (above some exemption level) and the other 18 feature graduated rate schedules.
Each municipality then chooses a multiplier that is applied proportionally to the cantonal
tax rate schedule. Hence, an individual’s overall tax liability depends on both the canton and
municipality of residence. This highly decentralized system induces local tax competition
and migration.
In 2018, the combined cantonal and municipal marginal wealth tax rates in the top bracket
ranged between 0.1% (canton of Nidwalden) and 1.1% (canton of Geneva). In 16 of the 26
canton capitals, the annual top wealth tax rate was below 0.5%. There is also some variation
in the tax-exempted amounts, ranging in 2018 from about $55,000 in the canton of Jura to
$250,000 in the canton of Schwyz (for married couples). Hence, even though it raises similar
overall revenue as the estimates for the U.S. proposals, the Swiss wealth tax is targeted at a
larger share of the population and is substantially less progressive.
The base of the Swiss wealth tax is broad: in principle, all assets, including those held
abroad, are taxable. Only foreign real estate, common household assets, and pension wealth
are exempt. The tax liability is based on net wealth, so taxpayers can deduct mortgages
and other debt. The annual reporting requirements for assets and liabilities allow the can-
tonal tax authorities to track the year-to-year evolution of wealth and cross-check it against
reported income (the so-called “wealth development test”), so the wealth tax serves a sup-
porting role for income tax enforcement.
Several aspects of the broader Swiss tax system provide context for the greater role of
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the wealth tax there. First, there is no capital gains tax on movable assets (for example,
shares of stock in a company) unless the owner professionally trades securities.5 Second,
almost all cantons have abolished taxes on gifts and bequests from parents to children. The
Swiss wealth tax therefore serves as a backstop to at least partly substitute for a capital gains
tax and an estate tax, which are common in other countries. Third, due to the institution
of bank secrecy within Switzerland, third-party reporting of financial assets is precluded,
which constrains enforcement. Fourth, while there are some guidelines for the valuation of
privately-held business assets based on a weighted average of capitalized earnings in recent
years and net asset holdings (Hongler and Mauchle 2020), it remains subject to considerable
discretion on the part of cantonal tax authorities, which may contribute to an equilibrium
where the wealthy are treated rather leniently.6
The Swiss wealth tax enjoys broad political support, as evidenced by the fact that it keeps
being reaffirmed by citizens in Switzerland’s direct democracy, where most tax policy deci-
sions must be put directly to voters. But its design and the role it plays in the overall tax sys-
tem are quite different from what is currently discussed in the United States. In particular, it
is not geared towards a major redistribution of wealth, and indeed wealth concentration in
Switzerland remains high in international comparison (Föllmi and Martinez, 2017).
3.3 Comparisons with Recent US Wealth Tax Proposals
During the 2019-20 Democratic presidential nomination campaign, two prominent candi-
dates, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, proposed that the United States enact an an-
nual wealth tax. The Sanders proposal featured graduated rates starting at 1% on net worth
above $32 million for a married couple, rising to a marginal tax rate of 8% on net worth
above $10 billion, while Warren proposed a 2% rate on net worth in excess of $50 million
and a 6% rate above $1 billion. The candidates claimed these levies would raise $3.75 trillion
and $4.35 trillion over 10 years, or approximately 1.34% and 1.56% of GDP and 7.9% and
9.1% of federal revenues.7
As Table 1 details, these US proposals differ quite substantially from the wealth taxes
across Europe—past and present—in a number of ways. First, the top marginal rates of
both the Sanders and Warren proposals are far higher than any top rate of the European
5As for real estate, there is a special capital gains tax at the cantonal level as well as a property tax at the
municipal level.
6Some cantons offer foreigners who live but do not work in Switzerland an exemption from regular taxation,
subjecting them instead to a flat-rate tax based on their living expenses, which has allowed some very rich
households to enjoy low tax burdens. The minimum tax rules under this alternative tax regime have been
tightened recently, and it currently affects fewer than 5000 individuals (Federal Department of Finance 2019).
7Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman advised Senator Warren regarding her proposal, produced the rev-
enue estimates, and have written a detailed explanation and defense of it (Saez and Zucman, 2019a).
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wealth taxes. Second, neither the Sanders nor Warren proposal has a cap on annual tax
payments as a share of income. Third, both the Sanders and Warren wealth tax proposals
have what is by European standards an exceptionally high exemption level. Under War-
ren’s plan, 75,000 households would be subject to the tax, while Sanders’ plan would apply
to 180,000 households. The very top rates would affect an even smaller group: Warren’s
top rate kicks in at $1 billion, applying to about 600 people as of October 2019 (according
to Forbes), while Sanders’ top rate begins at $10 billion, applying to only about 50 people.8
Fourth, both Sanders and Warren proposed unprecedently broad bases, including for exam-
ple assets held in trust, and (in Warren’s case) including retirement assets and assets held by
minor children. Fifth, the revenue to be raised from these wealth taxes as a share of GDP is
a third to a half above the Swiss level, which in turn is substantially higher than the revenue
raised in the other countries. Finally, the US wealth tax proposals would be federal, rather
than decentralized as in Spain or Switzerland.
Supporters of these proposals for a US wealth tax often discount the relevance of Euro-
pean experience with, and especially the wide abandonment of, wealth taxes on the grounds
that the details of the US plans, especially the high exemption level, rate schedule, broadness
of the base, and enforcement provisions, are very different than these other systems. This
is true, but it is a double-edged sword, as these unprecedented design features also make it
difficult to learn from experience and to predict its consequences with much confidence.
4 What Other Taxes Does a Wealth Tax Resemble?
Although the United States has never had an annual wealth tax, it has long experience with
several other related taxes.
4.1 Property Taxes
Local governments in the United States rely heavily on an annual tax on one form of wealth,
often called “immovable” property, in the form of property taxes. Property taxes account for
nearly half of own-source local government revenues.
The rate of tax levied on immovable property varies widely. Harris and Moore (2013)
report that, for the period 2007-2011, the mean property tax burden as a share of house
prices was 1.15%.
For a number of reasons, a property tax is not identical to an equivalent-rate wealth
tax. First, US property taxes do not allow for a deduction for debt. Second, the Tiebout
8The extreme targeting of top wealth levels has led some readers of an earlier draft to suggest that a more
appropriate title is “Taxing Their Wealth.”
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(1956) theory of property taxes emphasizes that households can choose among many dif-
ferent communities with varying levels of local public goods. In this setting, the property
tax, unlike a wealth tax, becomes a non-distorting price for local services, and has much dif-
ferent implications than a broader wealth tax not tied to public services. Third, immovable
property is only one component of wealth, and because the relative size of this component
varies dramatically across levels of household net worth, a property tax is not well-targeted
at the very wealthy. Using the 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances, Wolff (2017) estimates
that, while principal residences (the major but not only component of the property tax base)
account for 62% of the gross assets of individuals in the middle three quintiles of net worth,
they comprise only 8% of gross assets for the top 1%. Fourth, most local property taxes in
the United States feature a fixed rate, occasionally with an exempt level of property value.
Of course, other rate structures are possible. For example, the “council tax” in the United
Kingdom features a graduated rate structure based on the property value. Many US states
do levy a surcharge on the highest-value homes or have a progressive bracket structure
through their real estate transfer tax system, sometimes referred to as “mansion taxes.”
4.2 Estate and Inheritance Taxes
The US federal government has levied a tax on a base close to net worth since it enacted an
estate tax in 1916, and added a gift tax in 1924. This tax requires a valuation of taxable wealth
at death, coinciding with the probate process, which attempts to locate and determine the
net worth of the deceased. The US estate tax has a sizeable exemption level, which as of 2020
is $11.58 million for singles and $23.16 million for married couples, and features a flat rate
of 40% over the exemption. The revenue it generates has eroded over time, recently because
of legislated increases in the exemption level; in fiscal year 2019 it raised $16.7 billion, or
slightly less than 0.5% of federal revenues—less than one-tenth of what the Sanders and
Warren proposals projected to collect—from about 0.06% of decedents.
In principle, the estate tax is designed to target the superrich, but in practice many fea-
tures of the law allow them to significantly reduce their exposure. Notably, the effective
estate tax rate is reduced by extensive undervaluation of wealth transfers via, for exam-
ple, family limited partnerships, which are holding companies owned by two or more fam-
ily members created to retain a family’s business interests, real estate, publicly-traded and
privately-held securities. Due to the lack of control and lack of marketability that limited
partners possess, these interests can be transferred to future generations at a discount to
market value.
What is known about the consequences of an estate tax? Kopczuk (2013) surveys the
evidence and concludes that the literature suggests an elasticity of reported estates—which
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includes changes in real wealth accumulation, avoidance, and evasion—with respect to the
net-of-tax rate between 0.1 and 0.2. Eller et al. (2001) analyze estate tax evasion based on data
from a stratified random sample of federal estate tax returns as filed and audit assessments,
and they estimate the estate tax underreporting gap due to noncompliance to be 13%, but
this figure may substantially understate the true magnitude of the gap, in part because it
does not account for any noncompliance not detected during the IRS examination process.
4.3 Capital Gains Taxes
Any analysis of how the wealthy are taxed must confront how capital gains are taxed. For
the superrich, realized capital gains represent a very high fraction of reported income. For
example, IRS data shows that in tax year 2014 realized capital gains represented 60% of total
adjusted gross income (AGI) for the 400 highest-AGI Americans. In tax year 2016, those with
adjusted gross income over $10 million reported net capital gains corresponding to 46% of
their adjusted gross income, whereas it is a negligible fraction for those earning less than
$200,000 (Scheuer and Slemrod 2020).
A capital gains tax is of course not a wealth tax, because it applies to gains rather than
to the total value of the financial asset. Under current US law, capital gains are taxed at a
lower rate than other income and are taxed upon realization (usually sale) rather than ac-
crual, which generates a so-called deferral (or interest) advantage. Most importantly, capital
gains unrealized at death completely escape income taxation. Instead, there is a “step-up”
provision under which the value of an asset at the time of death becomes the tax basis for the
inheritor, so that if sold the taxable capital gain is calculated as if that was the purchase price.
Even though some of the income that gives rise to the appreciation of assets (such as corpo-
rate stock) is subject to taxation at the corporate level, corporate tax rates have come down
over time. Taken together with the extreme concentration of capital gains at the top, these
provisions have led to concerns that the overall progressivity of the income tax is eroding.
There have been a number of proposals to alter the capital gains tax in ways that would
restore tax progressivity without resorting to an annual wealth tax. As one example, President-
elect Joe Biden released a plan to tax capital gains and dividends at the same rate as ordinary
income for taxpayers with incomes exceeding $1 million and also to tax unrealized capital
gains at death. Combined with other proposed changes in the income tax code, Biden’s tax
plan would raise the top marginal tax rate for capital gains from 20% to 39.6%.
While Biden’s plan would eliminate two of the preferential tax provisions for capital
gains, it would retain the current system of taxation based on realization rather than accrual
other than at death, thereby preserving the advantage of being able to defer taxes within
a lifetime. In view of this, calls for the taxation of accrued capital gains have been made.
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For example, Batchelder and Kamin (2019) offer a menu of “incremental” revenue options,
including an accrual-based capital gains tax consisting of an annual mark-to-market tax on
publicly-traded assets plus a retrospective accrual tax for illiquid assets. Under a retrospec-
tive scheme, the capital gains tax is assessed upon realization, but the statutory tax rate rises
as the holding period lengthens, effectively charging interest on past gains when realiza-
tion occurs. This eliminates the need to value assets that are not actually being sold while
minimizing liquidity problems and the incentive to defer such realization (Auerbach 1991).
5 Consequences of a Wealth Tax
Imposing a wealth tax will tend to reduce the amount of taxed wealth, due to some combi-
nation of changes in wealth accumulation, shifts in financial choices, and outright evasion.
Here, we consider these various consequences, along with some discussion of the adminis-
trative and compliance costs of levying such a tax. We focus mostly on evidence from the
European wealth taxes, but also consider some evidence from related taxes like the estate
tax.
5.1 Evidence on the Overall Response to Wealth Taxes
Empirical studies of the behavioral response to wealth taxes are much sparser than for
income taxes, largely because wealth taxes themselves are much rarer than income taxes.
Moreover, because the tax bases and relevant enforcement details vary widely, applying the
evidence on the effect of one country’s tax to another is problematic. Indeed, some poten-
tially critical enforcement instruments, such as cross-country information exchange agree-
ments that are designed to constrain tax evasion using foreign accounts, post-date essentially
all of the studies.
We begin with four studies that find taxable wealth to be highly responsive to its tax
rate. Brülhart et al. (2019) take advantage of variations in the Swiss wealth tax rate across
cantons and over time and find that a 1 percentage-point decrease in wealth taxes increases
reported taxable wealth after six years by at least 43% (and by 96% for the subset of large
reforms). Comparing administrative tax records from two cantons suggests that about one-
fourth of the effect comes from taxpayer mobility and another one-fifth from house price
capitalization. They argue that savings responses cannot explain more than a small fraction
of the remainder, suggesting sizable evasion responses in this setting with no third-party
reporting of financial wealth.
Jakobsen et al. (2020) examine changes in the Danish wealth tax that was cut back be-
ginning in 1989 and abolished in 1997, taking advantage of two design aspects of this tax: a
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doubling of the exemption threshold for married couples and a cap on the ratio of income,
payroll, and wealth taxes as a fraction of income that renders the marginal wealth tax equal
to zero for those at the cap. For the very wealthy, they conclude that reducing the wealth
tax rate by 1 percentage point would raise taxable wealth by 21% after 8 years. Because the
estimated effect grows over time, they argue that it could not be all a one-time avoidance
effect. Instead, half of the long-run effect is mechanical since a higher wealth tax reduces
wealth even when behavior is unchanged.
Also sizeable are the estimated elasticities of Durán-Cabré et al. (2019) based on an anal-
ysis of the surprise re-introduction of a wealth tax in Catalonia in 2011. They find no ev-
idence of it reducing wealth accumulation, but find that the tax triggered substantial tax
avoidance via taxpayers changing their asset composition toward exempt assets (mainly
company shares) and induced taxpayers to reduce taxable income to take advantage of an
income-related cap on the sum of income and wealth tax liability. They find that a 1 per-
centage point reduction in the average wealth tax rate would lead to an increase in taxable
wealth of 32% over four years. Agrawal et al. (2020) look more closely at the migration
response, focusing on the fact that all Spanish regions levied positive wealth tax rates ex-
cept for Madrid. They conclude that, by five years after the reform, the number of wealthy
individuals residing in Madrid for tax purposes increased by 10% relative to other regions,
but conclude that misreporting rather than physical location change is likely the main factor.
As in Brülhart et al. (2019), this applies to sub-national variation in wealth tax rates, where
migration (or reported migration) is likely to be large relative to cross-national migration.
Zoutman (2018) studies a major reform to wealth and capital income taxation in the
Netherlands that occurred in 2001. Comparing households that were similar in wealth and
income, but treated differently by the reform, he concludes that a 1 percentage point decrease
in the wealth tax rate leads to a long-run increase in accumulated wealth of 14%.
Finally, Seim (2017) finds considerably smaller effects. Exploiting bunching around a
kink in the Swedish wealth tax rate schedule where the rate changes from 0% to 1.5%, he esti-
mates that a reduction in the wealth tax rate by 1 percentage point increases reported wealth
by 0.10 to 0.27%. He concludes that the elasticity mainly represents reporting responses, and
finds no evidence of households changing their saving or portfolio composition. 9
In sum, recent studies of the European experience suggest that the behavioral response to
wealth taxation can be substantial, but that the anatomy of the response—real versus avoid-
9In a recent study of Colombia, Londoño-Velez and Avila-Mahecha (2019) find evidence of bunching re-
sponses of reported wealth below notches in the tax rate structure and estimate that, in the short run, a 1
percentage point wealth tax cut increases reported wealth by 2%. They conclude that these responses reflect
predominantly avoidance and evasion, such as misreporting wealth items subject to less third-party reporting.
They also find that wealthy taxpayers increased compliance in response to incentives for the disclosure of pre-
viously hidden wealth, as well as in response to an exogenous increase in the risk of detection and punishment
due to the publication of the “Panama Papers.”
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ance versus evasion—varies a lot, in large part because of differences in the broadness of the
tax base. Advani and Tarrant (2020) offer a comprehensive review of these empirical studies
and attempt to explain the varying results based on design features, contextual factors, and
methodological differences.
There is an important interaction among these behavioral reactions. As Slemrod (2001)
details in a more general context, the tax disincentive to real behavior depends on how the
marginal cost of avoidance and evasion interacts with the real decision. In the extreme,
a tax that can be costlessly evaded will provide no disincentives for real behavior. This
insight suggests that when estimating the effects of a wealth tax, it is essential to understand
how design differences might affect the costs of evading the tax. Indeed, supporters of the
prominent US wealth tax proposals have suggested several reasons why it might be harder
to evade than the European experience would indicate: for example, the United States is
a much larger country, its tax system is citizenship-based rather than residence-based, the
proposals involve much higher exemption thresholds, they are accompanied by plans to
enhance tax enforcement, and their implementation would post-date the adoption of the
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in 2010. We take up some of these issues
below.
5.2 Real Behavioral Responses
A wealth tax reduces the after-tax return to saving. The most important potential real be-
havioral response is in terms of reduced saving and capital accumulation. This effect is
qualitatively the same as under other taxes on capital accumulation, such as a capital in-
come tax (see e.g. Bernheim 2002 for an overview). As seen above, though, one difference
is that a wealth tax can translate into higher capital income tax rates than are commonly
imposed (potentially exceeding 100%), which presumably leads to larger effects.
Taxes that appear to be levied on the wealthy may instead be borne by others via tax-
induced changes in pre-tax prices. For example, if a wealth tax reduces capital accumula-
tion, in the long run it may reduce average wage rates. Such an argument figured promi-
nently in the debate preceding the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, when supporters argued
that the proposed cut in the rate of corporate income tax would, via increased business in-
vestment and eventually a larger capital stock, increase average annual wages by as much as
$9,000; this suggests an avenue through which taxing “their” wealth ends up affecting “our”
wealth. This conclusion is highly controversial, however (for an overview of the arguments
made at this time, see Slemrod 2018 in this journal).
A wealth tax could also affect work effort, but there is no consensus on the relevant la-
bor supply elasticity. Notably, a substantial fraction of the very wealthy are (themselves or
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descendants of) principals in a rather successful business venture: of the wealthiest Ameri-
cans on the 2018 Forbes 400 list, 69% were “self-made” founders of their business (Scheuer
and Slemrod 2020). As a result, the relevant margin is probably not hours of work in the
narrow sense. Instead, the key effects may be on the incentives for entry into entrepreneur-
ship (Cullen and Gordon 2007, Scheuer 2014) and on the ownership and control structure of
business enterprises.
Due to the highly progressive nature of the wealth tax, it could, for example, discourage
entrepreneurial risk taking. Hall and Woodward (2020) document that entrepreneurial risk
is highly skewed, with most venture-capital backed startup companies faring poorly and a
few performing exceptionally well. Due to incentive problems, this risk cannot be diversi-
fied, which limits the attractiveness of entrepreneurship under reasonable risk aversion, so
further reducing entry might seem like a bad idea. However, because a risk-averse individ-
ual will have relatively low marginal utility in case of very good outcomes, the effect on ex
ante decisions of a wealth tax that applies only in those low-probability states of the world
could be modest.
Another concern is that a wealth tax might force entrepreneurs to continually reduce
their ownership in a company whose valuation increases over time in order to pay the tax
liability. Even if such founders are not primarily motivated by monetary incentives, but
instead are mostly interested in being able to realize their ideas, such an anticipated dilution
of control rights could have discouraging effects ex ante.
Might a US wealth tax induce some people to move out of the country? Because the US
taxes on the basis of citizenship rather than residence, moving does not relieve an Ameri-
can citizen of any tax obligations—instead, citizenship renunciation is required. There are
some prominent examples: Facebook co-founder Eduardo Saverin dropped his US citizen-
ship in favor of Singapore just prior to the Facebook IPO in 2012. But overall, US citizen-
ship renunciation by the wealthy has been very small. Between 2005 and 2017, more than
30,000 individuals dropped their US citizenship, of whom fewer than 100 reported net worth
greater than $100 million (Organ, 2020). Overall, however, about one-third of those drop-
ping citizenship were millionaires, compared with only about 5-6% in the US population.
An increase in renunciations in the 2010s was probably due to increased enforcement of tax
evasion using offshore accounts, prompting renunciation by dual citizens already resident
abroad. However, there is no historical precedent to help gauge the renunciation response
to a wealth tax at rates far above existing levels.10
10Senator Warren proposed a 40% exit tax on the net worth above $50 million of any US citizen who re-
nounces their citizenship, while Senator Sanders proposed a 40% exit tax on the net value of all assets under
$1 billion, and a 60% exit tax for those with wealth exceeding $1 billion. If enforced, these measures would
probably greatly limit any potential exit responses.
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5.3 Avoidance
One way to reduce wealth tax liability is to substitute to assets that face lower tax rates,
or to hold assets for which the value is harder to monitor and thus easier to successfully
understate. Spain offers a stark example: when it exempted some forms of closely-held
businesses from its wealth tax base, the share of the exempted stock as a share of all closely-
held businesses increased from 15 to 77% (Alvaredo and Saez 2009).
In a US context, a wealth tax might lead some high net-worth individuals to shift into
assets that are harder to value, such as keeping businesses private rather than going public.
Startup firms might forego equity infusions to avoid new valuation rounds, which could
constrain their expansion, or they could start issuing non-standard, less transparent types of
stocks. Hemel (2019) offers the example of companies deciding not to offer their shares on
public equity markets, even if a public offering would be the most efficient means of raising
capital, because a more transparent valuation will lead to a larger wealth tax liability for
its shareholders. Much wealth of the Forbes 400, for example, is currently held in publicly-
traded stock, but this feature cannot be taken as unresponsive to a potential wealth tax.
This is an example of a potentially substantial and distorting behavioral response of which
there is no trace in existing data; how likely it is to occur, and what enforcement responses
might constrain it, is very hard to know for sure. Such shifting into less visible assets would
also have repercussions for our measures of wealth inequality: it might look like a wealth
tax reduces concentration when in reality it partly shifts top wealth into forms that are less
susceptible to accurate measurement.11
5.4 Evasion
Government auditors typically lack the resources to trace sophisticated means of wealth tax
evasion—say, methods that work through layers of financial intermediaries. High-profile
leaks from these intermediaries, such as the 2007 leak from HSBC Bank in Switzerland and
the 2015 “Panama Papers” from the firm Mossack Fonseca, have allowed researchers to gain
insights into these forms of tax evasion. Alstadsæter et al. (2019) link the account names
from the HSBC leak with individual tax data for Norway, Sweden, and Denmark and find
that 95% of these foreign account-holders did not report the existence of the account to the
tax agency. They show that evasion rates rise sharply across the income distribution, and
conclude that the top 0.01% in the income distribution evade about 25% of the income and
wealth taxes they owe. Guyton et al. (2020) combine random audit data with data on off-
shore bank accounts and show that tax evasion for US taxpayers through offshore financial
11Another avenue of wealth tax avoidance is inter-vivos gifts. Research suggests that these gifts are tax-
sensitive (see, for example, Bernheim et al., 2004, and Joulfaian and McGarry, 2004).
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institutions is highly concentrated at the very top of the income distribution, and that ran-
dom audits virtually never detect this form of evasion.
Despite this new evidence, we do not yet know the extent to which a wealth tax at much
higher rates would be susceptible to evasion, although some of the studies of European
wealth taxes suggest substantial evasion. Its extent will certainly depend on the enforce-
ment environment, which is evolving. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) of
2010 set up third-party reporting requirements based on existing tax information exchange
agreements. Through threat of a punitive withholding tax for non-complying foreign finan-
cial institutions, FATCA provides US tax subjects with strong incentives to report to the IRS
the value and income generated by their foreign accounts.12 Both the Sanders and Warren
plans would expand enforcement further, proposing significant increases in the IRS enforce-
ment budget and a minimum audit rate for taxpayers subject to the wealth tax.
How effective such expanded enforcement would be in restraining evasion has been con-
troversial. Saez and Zucman (2019a) claim that evasion would shrink the wealth tax base
by just 15%. Kopczuk (2019) expressed skepticism, noting that the most effective tax en-
forcement relies on market transactions reported by third parties, which would be absent
for much wealth. This is not purely an enforcement problem because, as mentioned, the
valuation of many assets is objectively hard. Clever ideas have been put forward to address
this problem; for example, Allais (1977) proposed that wealth owners self-report the value
of their assets but then the government (or any other private bidder) could acquire these
assets at a surcharge of 40% (respectively, 50%). Such schemes come with their own difficul-
ties, though, especially with opaque assets, not to mention the political concerns about the
government owning a large share of businesses in the economy.
One difference between the wealth tax and the estate tax is that the former requires re-
porting at a much higher frequency. While this potentially raises compliance costs, the up-
side is that any evasion strategy must engineer an entire path of reports that is plausible on
a yearly basis, notably relative to yearly income, rather than just one end-of-life snapshot.
This may make it harder to systematically conceal wealth than in the case of the estate tax,
which allows for decades of planning without generating much data for tax authorities.
5.5 Administrative and Compliance Costs
A wealth tax imposes costs of collection, including the compliance costs borne by taxpayers
and third parties and the administrative costs borne by the government. Leiserson (2019) ex-
12 The international version of FATCA, known as the Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information
in Tax Matters (the AEOI Standard), began in September 2017 and, by 2019, 94 countries had exchanged infor-
mation. Johannesen et al. (2020) provide evidence on the impact of pre-FATCA enforcement policies aimed at
foreign accounts held by U.S. taxpayers.
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trapolates from experience with the US estate tax to estimate the ratio of private compliance
costs to revenues from a 2% wealth tax at 19%, which is approximately double the conven-
tional wisdom about the US income tax; he estimates government administrative costs to be
just 0.6% of revenue. Troup et al. (2020) estimate the compliance cost to be 1% to 1.5% of
total wealth in the first year based on the legal costs of the probate process in the UK, which,
depending on the tax rate, would mean costs roughly equivalent to tax revenue. However,
the compliance costs would fall in subsequent years due to repetition effects. Moreover, due
to the fixed-cost nature of valuation and reporting efforts, the compliance cost relative to
revenue declines if a higher wealth tax rate is applied.
6 Are Wealth Taxes Part of an Optimal Tax System?
We now turn to the normative question whether wealth accumulation should be taxed and, if
so, the extent to which a wealth tax should be a preferred mechanism for doing so. A grow-
ing literature in public economics has started to incorporate more realistic labor markets into
models of optimal tax policy, accounting for phenomena such as rent-seeking, skill-biased
technological change, and superstar effects, to name just a few advances (for an overview,
see Scheuer and Slemrod 2020). This line of work has focused on the optimal design of labor
income taxes in static models that capture recent trends in occupational sorting and wage
inequality. Because a growing concentration of earnings can affect, through savings, the de-
gree of wealth inequality down the road, this raises the question whether these trends also
affect the optimal taxation of capital or wealth.
6.1 The Atkinson-Stiglitz Benchmark
Suppose first that all wealth inequality is driven by inequality in labor incomes. In this case,
the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) theorem provides a classic benchmark. It states that, if a non-
linear labor income tax is available, any distortion of savings is Pareto-inefficient whenever
preferences satisfy two conditions: i) they are separable between consumption and labor;
and ii) all individuals have the same utility over consumption across time. In other words, if
individuals only differ in their labor productivities, and the recent rise in wealth inequality
is the result of changes in labor markets, such as top earners being able to leverage their
skills on a larger scale (Scheuer and Werning 2017), then the policy response should be to
adjust the progressivity of labor income taxes. The taxation of capital income or wealth on
top of that is not justified.
This theorem is a conceptually useful baseline, but the underlying assumptions are not
realistic. First, Saez (2002) has suggested a positive correlation between labor productivities
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and savings propensities. This violates the Atkinson-Stiglitz condition (ii), because individ-
uals will differ in their discount rates in a way that is related to earnings abilities. Similarly,
when individuals differ in their rates of return on their wealth, this lends support to the
additional taxation of capital (Gerritsen et al. 2020). Second, disentangling labor and capital
income can be challenging in practice, so capital income taxes may be needed to minimize
revenue-losing tax-base shifting from labor to capital income (Christiansen and Tuomala
2008). Third, when agents face uncertainty and are risk averse, taxing capital income can
improve incentives for labor supply (Golosov et al., 2006). Fourth, current policymakers do
not face a blank slate, but instead face a situation with pre-existing wealth inequality. In-
dividuals already differ in the wealth they own, either because they have inherited it from
previous generations or because they themselves have saved in the past.
6.2 A One-Time Tax on Existing Wealth
In principle, pre-existing wealth inequality could be alleviated in a lump-sum fashion through
a one-time, unanticipated wealth tax. Indeed, historically, various countries have used one-
time wealth taxes to deal with revenue shortfalls, such as war-time spending shocks. In
1999, Donald J. Trump, then a candidate for the Reform Party presidential nomination, pro-
posed a 14.25% one-time “net worth tax” on individuals and trusts worth more than $10
million in order to eliminate the US national debt. More recently, calls have been made for a
time-limited, progressive wealth levy to stem the fiscal burden arising from the coronavirus
pandemic (for example, Landais et al. 2020).
From an optimal tax perspective, such policies are attractive because they avoid behav-
ioral distortions by only touching wealth that has already been accumulated.13 But this ap-
pealing feature critically hinges on the ability of policymakers to implement such on short
notice and on their commitment not to make such taxes permanent or to reintroduce them
periodically when similar times come about in the future, which would lead to reputational
damage. In the past, originally one-off war taxes have often turned into long-lasting tax
policies.
6.3 Taxing Future Wealth Accumulation
If an unexpected, distortion-free redistribution of existing wealth is not feasible, one policy
option is to adjust the labor income tax going forward. If initial wealth and earnings abilities
are positively correlated, a more progressive labor income tax could be used to target both
13Taxes on existing wealth can be replicated, in principle, by consumption taxes coupled with subsidies on
labor income. Moreover, even though taxing pre-existing wealth has no incentive effects, it has redistributive
effects across age cohorts because those who are older tend to have more wealth.
19
determinants of inequality, at least indirectly. The alternative is to introduce a tax on future
wealth accumulation, which will of course distort the savings incentives of individuals. We
now present a parsimonious model to show that a tax on wealth accumulation will be part
of the optimal tax mix, even if preferences satisfy conditions (i) and (ii), and that the optimal
schedules of the wealth and labor income tax are closely linked.14
Suppose individuals have a fixed labor productivity θ ∼ F(θ). They live for two periods
t = 0, 1: They work, consume and save in the first period and consume out of their (after-tax)
savings in the second (which can be interpreted as retirement). Their preferences are
u(c0)− h(y0/θ) + βu(c1),
where ct is consumption in period t, y0 is the labor income earned in period 0, and β is
a common discount factor. Importantly, these preferences satisfy the Atkinson-Stiglitz as-
sumptions: (i) the disutility of labor h is separable from the utility of consumption, and (ii)
the subutility of consumption u(c0) + βu(c1) is common across individuals.15
There is a linear savings technology with gross rate of return R (again common across
individuals). Individual θ is born with wealth k0(θ) in period 0. Notice that the initial wealth
inequality is perfectly correlated with labor productivity θ. This is assumed to conceptually
weaken the scope of a wealth tax: If the correlation were imperfect, so that there could be
individuals with the same labor income but very different initial wealth levels, we would
be in a situation with two-dimensional heterogeneity and a labor income tax alone would
be insufficient to achieve redistribution across these two dimensions. Here, this well-known
argument for a wealth tax does not apply.
Because we assume that no direct tax on initial wealth is possible, the remaining policy
instruments are a tax on first-period labor income Ty(y0) and a tax on second-period wealth
Tk(Rk1), which is equivalent to a tax on capital income in this model. Individuals’ budget
constraints are
c0 = y0 − Ty(y0) + k0 − k1 (1)
c1 = Rk1 − Tk(Rk1). (2)
If k0(θ) was common across all θ, the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem would imply that, at any
Pareto optimum, Tk(Rk1) = 0: We should only use the labor income tax Ty(y0) to achieve
redistribution. Here we ask what happens when k0(θ) varies across individuals: Is the labor
14Cremer et al. (2001) observe that the Atkinson-Stiglitz uniform commodity taxation result breaks down
when individuals have heterogeneous endowments and offer simulations of the optimal tax system in a four-
type model.
15With heterogeneity in individuals’ savings propensities, governed by β, in addition to heterogeneity in
labor skills θ, it is well known that the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem does not apply and there is a case for savings
taxes. We rule this out to stack the cards against a wealth tax.
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tax Ty still sufficient to deal with both initial wealth inequality and labor income inequality,
or should we (also) use the tax on future wealth accumulation Tk despite its distortionary
effects? Proposition 1 shows that the latter is optimal.















where σ denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ε the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
α = k0/c0 measures the share of period-0 consumption financed out of initial wealth, and η(θ) ≡
k′0(θ)θ/k0(θ) the elasticity of initial wealth with respect to labor productivity.
To gain intuition for the formula, consider first the case with no initial wealth inequality,
so η = 0. Hence, we return to the Atkinson-Stiglitz benchmark with T′k(Rk1) = 0 and all
desired redistribution is achieved through the labor income tax. The same is true when the
intertemporal substitution elasticity σ is infinite (the saving distortions induced by a wealth
tax explode) or when the Frisch elasticity ε is zero (inelastic labor supply implies that the
labor tax is lump-sum, so there is no need for an additional wealth tax).
Second, more generally, formula (3) links the shapes of the wealth and labor income tax
schedules at any optimum (as both are driven by the redistributive motives of the govern-
ment). But the term in square brackets introduces a wedge between the two. For instance,
suppose σ and ε are fixed parameters.16 Then any variation in this term is determined by
how αη varies across the distribution. If αη, which summarizes the importance of initial
wealth relative to labor income inequality, is increasing towards the top, the wealth tax
should be more progressive than the labor income tax, and vice versa.17
The parameters in formula (3) can all be connected to empirical statistics; notably, η can
be backed out from the joint distribution of wealth and income. For example, suppose the
marginal tax rates on wealth and labor income converge to the constants tk and ty at the top,
respectively, and the same holds for the intertemporal substitution elasticity σ, the Frisch
elasticity ε and the importance of initial wealth as captured by the statistic α. Then we have
the following corollary of Proposition 1:









16This would be the case when u(c) exhibits constant relative risk aversion and the disutility of labor is
iso-elastic.
17It can also be shown that T′k(Rk1) > 0 under standard redistributive motives.
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where ty is the top marginal income tax rate and ρk and ρy are the Pareto tail coefficients of the wealth
and labor income distribution, respectively.
It is straightforward to calibrate this formula. For instance, suppose σ = 1, so u(c) =
log(c). Because α ≤ 1+ β, we can use the formula to obtain an upper bound to the marginal
wealth tax rate. Empirical estimates suggest ρk ≈ 1.4 and ρy ≈ 1.6. Moreover, suppose
ε = .3 and ty = 50%. Interpreting the period length in this two-period model as roughly 30





1× 1.4 + .3× 1.6
.3× 1.4× 1.6 − 1
]−1
= 56%
over the 30-year horizon, or an annual wealth tax of at most
tannualk ≤ 1− (1− .56)
1/30 = 2.7%.
In sum, unless there is already a fully equalized wealth distribution, it is generally op-
timal to introduce progressive taxes on future wealth accumulation on top of labor income
taxes, despite their distortive effects, at least for some amount of time. In the long run, of
course, the effect of initial wealth on overall inequality will diminish. Indeed, the influential
Chamley-Judd result argued that zero capital taxation is optimal in the long run; Judd (1985)
argued that this result holds even in the face of extreme wealth inequality, while Chamley
(1986) instead considered long-run capital taxation in a representative agent framework.
However, Straub and Werning (2020) have recently demonstrated that Judd’s result is in-
valid whenever the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is at most one—which seems the
empirically relevant level—and the long-run tax on capital should in fact be positive and
significant. For higher elasticities, it converges to zero, but possibly at a very slow rate—for
decades, or even centuries.18
6.4 Wealth versus Capital Income Taxes
We conclude that the modern theory of optimal taxation lends support to taxing wealth
accumulation. However, the existing literature does not pin down the appropriate tax in-
struments to use for this purpose. As discussed in Section 2, in standard models, the wealth
tax is equivalent to a tax on capital income. Given that most countries already have progres-
sive capital income taxes, for instance, what might justify levying a wealth tax instead, or in
18Chamley’s (1986) model imposes an upper bound on capital taxes, and Straub and Werning (2020) provide
conditions under which this bound is binding forever at the optimum, also implying positive long-run capital
taxes. Saez and Stantcheva (2018) show that when wealth enters utility directly, in addition to the consumption
it finances, the optimal long-run capital tax is also positive.
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addition?
When individuals differ in the rates of return r on their wealth, there is a tradeoff be-
tween wealth taxes and capital income taxes that depends on the source of these differences.
Because the capital-income-tax equivalent of a given wealth tax rate tw is given by tw/r,
Allais (1977) pointed out that a wealth tax favors wealth holders with high rates of return
relative to a capital income tax. Hence, relative to a capital income tax a wealth tax encour-
ages the reallocation of capital from “idle” wealth holders to productive entrepreneurs. In a
quantitative model, Guvenen et al. (2018) find significant efficiency gains from this effect of
compared to a uniform capital income tax.
There is, however, an opposing effect. If heterogeneous returns reflect heterogeneous
windfall gains, rents, or excess profits (perhaps due to market power or inside information),
rather than actual productivity differences, then taxing away such gains has well-known effi-
ciency benefits (Rothschild and Scheuer 2016). But a wealth tax gets this exactly reversed—it
taxes the normal rate of return and leaves the excess returns untouched. For example, if all
investors have a real rate of return of 3%, but some earn additional excess profits on their
investments, then a 3% wealth tax would not target any of those rents, whereas a capital
income tax would.
A related issue is that much of what shows up as return to capital on the tax reports of the
superrich (for example, in the form of realized capital gains) is arguably compensation to la-
bor from the work that went into building a successful company or picking high-performing
assets. In Scheuer and Slemrod (2020), we argue that the ability to convert this kind of la-
bor income into preferentially-taxed capital gains is a key margin of behavioral response to
taxes at the top, which we refer to as the “plasticity” of the tax base. A wealth tax only taxes
some normal return, whereas a capital income tax hits the full extent of such shifted labor
compensation.
Some progress has been made in measuring the extent and nature of return heterogeneity
(for example, Fagereng et al., 2020). However, a comprehensive decomposition into actual
productivity differences versus differential rents or shifted labor compensation has not yet
been accomplished.
7 Political Economy
The case for a wealth tax often reaches beyond specifically economic questions of tax in-
cidence and redistribution and is based on a concern that rising inequality of income and
wealth may lead to adverse political outcomes. As one example, excessive inequality might
allow the rich to capture the political system and tilt it in their favor. From a somewhat
different angle, Farhi et al. (2012), Piketty (2014), and Scheuer and Wolitzky (2016) have
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emphasized concerns going back to Karl Marx, who predicted that an increase in the con-
centration of wealth would lead to a revolution and to radical redistribution. We briefly
consider both perspectives and the extent to which they can justify a wealth tax.
7.1 Wealth and Political Power
Even in a “one-person, one-vote” democracy, the superrich can affect politics more than
others through campaign contributions, ownership of media outlets, or lobbying activities.
Gilens (2014) and Bartels (2016) collect evidence that political decisions often are more sensi-
tive to the preferences of the rich than those of the median voter. Accordingly, proponents of
a progressive wealth tax have argued that reducing the wealth of the superrich is a desirable
objective in itself, beyond the revenue it could raise to effect redistribution. Indeed, Saez
and Zucman (2019b) propose setting wealth tax rates above the revenue-maximizing rate,
expressing a willingness to reduce the wealth of the superrich in the interest of preventing
an “oligarchic drift” that would otherwise undermine democracy. Of course, there is some
tension between enacting a wealth tax to fund redistribution initiatives (such as “Medicare
for All” in the recent US proposals) and enacting a wealth tax with the goal to collect less
than the revenue-maximizing amount.
Even if concerns about an extreme concentration of wealth and political power are war-
ranted, the jury is still out on the extent to which a wealth tax is the appropriate tool to
address the problem. Other instruments may be better targeted at ensuring a more equal
political representation, such as regulating campaign contributions and public financing of
political campaigns. Some European countries offer examples of democracies where money
plays a smaller role in politics than in the United States, and Brechenmacher (2018) con-
cludes that wealthy elites exerting disproportionate political influence is a distinctly US
phenomenon. One particular concern with the wealth tax is that it might encourage the
wealthy to become more politically active, in an attempt to reduce their wealth tax liability
through, for example, political donations.
7.2 Politically Sustainable Tax Policy
One can argue that the primary role of a wealth tax is to make tax policy and the resulting
inequality more stable so that it can resist the threat of political upheaval. Such threats were
important drivers of tax and welfare state policies in 19th and 20th century Europe, when
the socialist movement gained momentum (Esping-Andersen 1990), and they are palpable
today in many South American countries. If political instability is an urgent problem, annual
wealth taxes are able to compress the wealth distribution relatively quickly compared to, say,
24
taxes on bequests or capital income.
One approach to modelling this question is to focus on tax policies that will maintain
the support of a majority of citizens over time. Scheuer and Wolitzky (2016) show that the
optimal sustainable tax policy involves a positive marginal tax on the wealth accumulation
of the rich, while subsidizing that of the middle class. Ex post, there is always a temptation
to impose wealth taxes, because at this point, wealth accumulation is sunk. However, if
the future is likely to bring near-confiscatory wealth taxes, then individuals anticipating this
outcome would save very little in the first place, leading eventually to a poor outcome for
everyone. Hence, ex ante it is better to tax the savings of the rich at least to some degree and
create a middle class that accumulates enough wealth to successfully oppose more extreme
redistribution in the future.
Of course, if the issue is reducing the impetus for political disruption based on tensions
related to income inequality, the wealth tax needs to be compared to a range of other polit-
ical alternatives: for example, a combination of a progressive increase in income tax rates,
more tax audits, expanding the estate tax, reforms to capital gains taxation, refocusing gov-
ernment spending on those with lower income levels, or an expansion of social insurance
programs.
8 Conclusion
In recent years, many European countries decided that a wealth tax did not belong in their
armory of tax instruments. Although the US has never had such a tax, perceptions of unac-
ceptably high income and wealth inequality have recently galvanized support for one, and
two prominent senators have produced detailed proposals. These proposals differ quite
substantially from the experience of their European counterparts. Thus, the evidence about
the consequences of wealth taxation in Europe is in any event of limited usefulness. On
the one hand, the broader base along with promised expanded enforcement will limit the
revenue leakage and distortion from avoidance and evasion, while exacerbating real behav-
ioral responses. On the other hand, the higher top rates and targeting of the superrich will
concentrate the revenue pressure on those taxpayers with the best means and strongest in-
centives to avoid the tax. Hence, when evaluating these US wealth tax proposals, one can
at best hold one’s breath and extrapolate broadly from the European wealth tax experience
and the US experience with similar taxes, and gain insight from optimal tax reasoning about
whether to tax capital via an annual wealth tax. Given rising economic inequality in the
United States, proposals for taxes on wealth accumulation in some form are likely to remain
an ongoing subject of debate.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Because initial wealth k0 cannot be directly targeted, this amounts to the assumption that
both θ and k0 are unobservable to the government. In other words, lump-sum instruments
based on labor productivities or initial wealth are unavailable. This means that the gov-
ernment cannot directly control c0(θ): instead, it can only determine ĉ0(θ) ≡ c0(θ)− k0(θ).
Intuitively, the government can give individuals a transfer in t = 0 of the amount ĉ0, but
their actual consumption will then be given by c0 = ĉ0 + k0, which is unobservable.
By the revelation principle, any allocation (ĉ0(θ), c1(θ), y0(θ)) that is attainable through
some tax system must therefore satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints
u(ĉ0(θ) + k0(θ))− h(y0(θ)/θ) + βu(c1(θ)) ≥ u(ĉ0(θ′) + k0(θ))− h(y0(θ′)/θ) + βu(c1(θ′))
(4)










g(θ) [u(ĉ0(θ) + k0(θ))− h(y0(θ)/θ) + βu(c1(θ))] dF(θ)
using some Pareto weights g(θ).
Define
V(θ) ≡ u(ĉ0(θ) + k0(θ))− h(y0(θ)/θ) + βu(c1(θ)).
The necessary envelope condition corresponding to (4) is









It is useful to formulate the planning problem in terms of (V(θ), c1(θ), y0(θ)) using
ĉ0(θ) = Φ [V(θ) + h(y0(θ)/θ)− βu(c1(θ))]− k0(θ)
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where µ(θ) and λ denote the multipliers on the incentive and resource constraints, respec-























This already reveals that there is a savings wedge at the optimum whenever k′0(θ) 6= 0 and
µ(θ) 6= 0.
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The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is

















Together with the definition of α(θ) = k0(θ)/c0(θ) and η(θ) ≡ k′0(θ)θ/k0(θ), this delivers
the result in (3).
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A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
The individuals’ Euler equation is




(1− ty)y0 + k0 − c0
))
.
With a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ, this can be written as
c0 = γ
(
(1− ty)y0 + k0 − c0
)
with










and hence α ≤ 1 + 1/γ.
With a constant Frisch elasticity ε, the first-order condition for y0 is
y0 = (1− ty)εθ1+εc
− εσ
0 .
If α(θ)→ α > 0 and η(θ)→ η as θ grows large, then for high-earners
y0(θ)→ κyθ1+ε(1−η/σ)
for some constant κy. Second-period wealth is
Rk1(θ) = R
(
(1− ty)y0(θ) + k0(θ)− c0(θ)
)
,
which under the same conditions becomes
Rk1(θ)→ κ̃yθ1+ε(1−η/σ) + κkθη
for some constants κ̃y and κk. Because the Pareto tail coefficient of the empirical income
distribution ρy is typically higher than that of the empirical wealth distribution ρk (because
wealth is more unequally distributed than income) and in this model both are driven by
the same underlying skill parameter θ, this implies that the Pareto tail coefficient of the








ρy and ρθ = ηρk,
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Substituting this in (3) delivers the sufficient-statistics formula in Corollary 1.
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